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This paper purports to provide some evidence on the effect of rating agencies on herding in financial markets. By means 
of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the effect and interaction between private and public information. Previous 
experiments showed that lemmings behaviour can survive in a market context where information is private (Hey and 
Morone, 2004), and that an experimental market can be very volatile and not efficient in transmitting information 
(Alfarano et al., 2006). We study experimentally, if socially undesirable behaviour – that survives in a market contest – 
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 1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to study whether the presence of a rating agency can endorse the 
aggregation process of private information. The theoretical background of our work is given by two 
models dealing respectively with herd behaviour (Banerjee, 1992) and informational cascades 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). These models were initially developed in a non-
market context and showed that imitative behaviour can cause information externalities (Becker, 
1991). That may result from private information not being publicly shared. Those models often 
make strong assumptions about the available information, the choices to make, the timing of 
decisions, and the symmetry of equilibrium. Specifically, both papers showed that individuals, 
acting sequentially on the basis of private information and public knowledge on the others’ 
behaviour, may end up choosing the socially undesirable option
1. 
There is a well know and established branch of literature addressing the information 
aggregation in market contexts. A very early reference is the classic paper by Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1976, 1980), which showed that uninformed traders can become informed through the price in such 
a way that private information is aggregated correctly and efficiently
2. 
Experimental economics literature suggests that the market may act as a sort of disciplining 
device on ‘irrational’ behaviour in individual contexts (Smith, 1962; Plott and Sunder ,1982). Hey 
and Morone (2004) emended a simple model of informational cascades in a market contest. This 
allowed relaxing some of the assumptions about the available information (i.e. subjects can buy 
information at any time and in any quantity); the choices to make (i.e. subjects can buy or sell assets 
or they can decide to do nothing); the timing of decisions (i.e. subjects act simultaneously). They 
showed that whenever complexity (measured by the quality and the quantity of information present 
in the market) increases, noise (measured by the volatility of prices) increases as well. Consequently 
herding is less likely when the quality and quantity of information in the market are higher. 
                                                 
1  For some experimental evidence and theoretical developments see Anderson and Holt (1997), Allsopp and Hey 
(2000), Fiore and Morone (2008), and Morone and Samanidou (2008). 
2 A summary of the progress made by this strand of literature can be found in Plott (2002). Alfarano et al. (2007) studied an experimental asset market where subjects decided whether to keep 
their money in a bank account with a constant risk-free interest rate or invest in a risky asset, paying 
a random dividend. They analyzed whether different degrees of heterogeneity in the information 
available to the traders are responsible of their observed heterogeneous behaviour, and, ultimately, 
whether such heterogeneity of strategy plays a crucial role in the empirically identified market 
inefficiencies. They showed that the experimental assets markets were not efficient in transmitting 
information, as transaction prices are far away from the fundamental value of the asset. However, 
the presence of more information in the market has some effects on trading volume and variance. 
An interesting issue, that was never investigated experimentally, is the role of rating 
agencies in their interaction with financial markets. In essence, there seem to be only few 
theoretical contributions while several papers have addressed empirically the market impact of the 
rating agencies. Among the former contributions, Millon and Thakor (1985) demonstrate that 
information gathering agencies may arise in a world of informational asymmetries and moral 
hazard. According to them, in a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents 
whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality, the formation of 
information gathering agencies is justified because it: (1) enables screening agents to diversify their 
risky payoffs, and (2) allows information sharing. However, Millon and Thakor (1985) assume 
perfect knowledge by the information gathering agency about the underlying risk of the borrower 
and do not model the possibility that investors may wish to verify ex post the quality of the 
information provided by the rating agencies. In a more general setup, one would like to model the 
effort of and the payoffs to the rating agency.
3 Still on theoretical grounds, referring to a multiple 
equilibria set up, Boot et al. (2004) show that the rating is a coordinating mechanism, providing a 
“focal point” for firms and investors, thanks to the implicit contract relationship (monitor-
renegotiate). However, Carlson and Hale (2006) reach opposite conclusions. They build a game 
                                                 
3 For instance, Kuhner (1999) argues that, in a systemic crisis, their payoffs may lead rating agencies to an equilibrium 
in which they pool “good” borrowers together with “bad” borrowers. theoretic model of rating agencies in which heterogeneous investors act strategically, predicting that 
introducing a rating agency to a market that otherwise would have the unique equilibrium, can bring 
about multiple equilibria. 
If the conclusions on the role played by the rating agencies are not unanimous in the 
theoretical literature, on empirical grounds the prevailing view is that rating agencies do bring new 
information to markets when they downgrade issuers but not when they improve their ratings. 
Indeed, significant negative abnormal returns are generally observed in equity and bond markets for 
issuers after they suffer a rating downgrade, while no (positive) abnormal return is typically 
detected in conjunction with upgradings (Barron et al., 1997; Ederington and Goh, 1998; Goh and 
Ederington, 1993, 1999; Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Impson et 
al., 1992; Liu et al., 1999; Matolcsy and Lianto, 1995; Wansley et al., 1992; Zaima and McCarthy, 
1988).
4 
In the following section the experimental design is reported. In section 3 the different 
treatments are described in details. The results of the experiment are presented in section 4. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. The experimental design 
We have a market composed by n agents; each one is endowed – at the beginning of each trading 
period – with m  units of an unspecified asset, and M units of experimental money (actually 
equivalent to real money as the exchange rate is one for one). This asset pays a single uncertain 
pay-off at the end of the trading period (i.e. a dividend). Apart from the dividend paid out at the end 
of each trading period, assets are worthless at the end of the period. There are two equally likely 
states of the world: i.e. H and L. In H the dividend is equal to d, in L the dividend is equal to 0. At 
the beginning of each trading period the true state of the world is determined by the experimenter – 
                                                 
4 Contrary to most authors, a limited number of papers find evidence of negative abnormal returns following rating 
downgrades (Glascock et al., 1987; Hsueh and Liu, 1992). but not revealed to the agents. The agents observe a public signal and can buy private signals – both 
(public and private) signals are partially but not totally informative as to the true state of the world. 
Public signals are of a better quality with respect to private ones. These signals take either the value 
1 or 0. More precisely, the probability of getting a public signal of 1 is P if the state of the world is 
H; the probability of getting a public signal of 1 is 1-P if the state of the world is L, the probability 
of getting a private signal of 1 is p if the state of the world is H; the probability of getting a private 
signal of 1 is 1-p if the state of the world is L. 
In most respects this experimental design is similar to Hey and Morone (2004), though it 
differs in the crucial point that subjects receive public information. This is an important change in 
the experimental design, as it allows us to study whether the presence of public information may act 
as a sort of disciplining mechanism in the market, promoting the aggregation of noisy information. 
However, this difference does not change the nature of the solution to the model as agents are 
informed about relevant parameters – the positive dividend d, the cost of buying a signal c, and the 
probabilities P and p. 
 
3. The experimental details 
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software of Urs Fischbacher (2007). It was run at 
the laboratory ESSE at the University of Bari. A Power Point presentation, pre-set to run at a 
particular speed, was showed on all subjects’ computer screens. This was followed by a practice 
session in which particular subjects were asked to perform particular tasks (make a bid, make an 
ask, buy, sell, and buy one or more signals). The briefing period lasted some 40 minutes. An 
example of the Power Point presentation can be found at http://www.dse.uniba.it/istruzioni. 
We had n = 15 agents, each of whom was endowed with 1000 ECU, and 10 units of the 
asset. The dividend d on each unit of the asset was either 10 ECU or 0 ECU. At the beginning of the 
trading period the dividend was randomly determined by the experimenter and paid out at the end of 
the trading period. It was unknown to the agents until the end of the trading period. The experiment consisted in 4 “practice” periods and 10 “real” periods. Players were paid only for the profits made 
over the 10 real periods. Each period lasted 4 minutes; the whole experiment lasted a bit more than 
one hour and thirty minutes, including reading instructions and the subjects’ payment. 
We run six different treatments. Each of them was carried out once. Treatments 
parameterizations are reported in table 1. 
Treatment  P c P 
A
5  60% 4  ECU  - 
B 65%  4  ECU  - 
1  55% 4  ECU 75% 
2  65% 4  ECU 75% 
3  55% 4  ECU 80% 
4  65% 4  ECU 80% 
5  55% 4  ECU 85% 
6  65% 4  ECU 85% 
Table 1: Treatments’ parameters. 
Hey and Morone (2004) showed that herd behaviour might be observed in a market context. 
Their “results suggest that the volatility of prices is lower (with the implication that herding is less 
likely) when the quality and the quantity of information in the market are higher”. Quality is an 
exogenous variable in our experiment and it is a function of the noisiness of the signal. Since we are 
interested in studying whether public information can stimulate the aggregation of private 
information we decided to concentrate our study on the cases where private signals are very noisy 
(i.e. p = 0.55, and p = 0.65). Quantity is an endogenous variable, we believe it can be influenced, 
somehow, by the quality of the public information. We predicted that more accurate public 
information would induce agents to buy fewer private signals. 
As far as the private signal probability is concerned, as p rises, the private information 
becomes more reliable – hence, the quality of the information present in the system improves – and 
this might produce some considerable effect on price volatility. We shall expect: 
(H1) less volatility in Treatment 2 compared to Treatment 1; 
(H2) less volatility in Treatment 4 compared to Treatment 3. 
                                                 
5 Source: Treatment 1 in Hey and Morone (2004). (H3) less volatility in Treatment 6 compared to Treatment 5. 
 
As far as the public signal probability is concerned, as P  rises, the public information 
becomes more reliable
6 – hence, the quality of the common information present in the system, at the 
beginning of the trading period, improves – and this might produce some considerable effect on the 
aggregation of information in the market and so on price volatility. We should expect: 
(H4) volatility decreases through treatment 5, 3, and 1; 
(H5) volatility decreases through treatment 6, 4, and 2.  
 
4. Results 
In order to summarise the results of our experiment we report the graphs of the traded prices 
(figures 1 to 6), the dividend, the rating agency signal and the private signal in each of the 10 
periods for each treatments. In each graph, on the horizontal axis is plotted time in seconds and the 
vertical lines break up the experimental session into its 10 market periods
7. The small blue squares 
are trades. We have joined together the trades in chronological order. The black diamonds at 12 and 
at –2 are purchased signals; those plotted at 12 refer to cases where the signal was 1 (suggesting that 
the true dividend would be 10 ECU) and those plotted at –2 refer to cases where the signal was 0 
(suggesting that the true dividend would be 0 ECU). The red lines plotted at 0 or at 10 show the 
actual true dividend (revealed, recall, to the participants only at the end of the trading period). 
Finally the green lines plotted at -3 or at 13 show the rating agency signal (revealed to all subjects at 
the beginning of each periods). 
 
                                                 
6 The quality of information may vary across rating agencies because of different reasons. For instance, Norden and 
Weber (2004) show that reviews for downgrade by S&P and Moody’s have the largest impact on credit default swaps 
and shares, while Ferri (2004) finds that the quality of information implicit in the ratings depends on the effort exerted 
by the rating agency. 


















Price Rating Agency Signal Private Signal Dividend
 
FIGURE 1: TRADE IN TREATMENT 1 
Treatment 1. This is characterized by a lot of noise and volatility and a great deal of market activity. 
In periods 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 there is a general tendency for the mean price to move in the correct 
direction, though this is not always the case – in trading periods 1, 3, 4, and 10 we can observe a 
general tendency for the mean price to move in the wrong direction. It is interesting to note that this 
apparent balance disappears if we relate the general tendency of the mean price to the public signal. 
In this case we can observe that in all periods the mean price moves in the direction of the public 
signal. This is clear evidence of the key role played by the rating agency. In this treatment we can 
observe 2 wrong herds. The more obvious one occurs at period 4; where the assets prices rise up to 
9-10. It is interesting to note that the bubble starts at 1/3 of the period, once subjects stop buying 
private information. The results of this period provide moderate evidence against the prevailing 
view that rating agencies do bring new information to the market when they downgrade issuers but 
not when they improve their ratings. The second herd occurs at period 10, also in this case – even 
though the phenomenon is less strong – it starts once subjects stop buying private signals. Of course, we cannot know in which direction causality goes. In other words, does the bubble start 
when subjects do not buy signals or do subjects stop buying signals once the bubble starts? Though 





















Price Rating Agency Signal Private Signal Dividend
 
FIGURE 2: TRADE IN TREATMENT 2 
Treatment 2. Also this treatment is characterized by a lot of volatility and a high transactions 
volume. In figure 6 we report the trading volumes. The volume decreases over time in 6 periods out 
of 10 , and in the remaining 4 periods it increases over time. It is interesting to note that the volume 
activity in Treatment 2 is much lower than it was in Treatment 1. Consistently with Hey and 
Morone (2004), we can explain this finding referring to the fact that subjects bought more signals 
(see tables 2 and 3) in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1 and so they were better informed. 
 
 Period  # signals  # 1  # 0 
1 17  10  7 
2 18 4  14 
3 13 8  5 
4 22 8  14 
5 21  10  11 
6 7 3  4 
7 7 4  3 
8 16 8  8 
9 4 0  4 
10 15  6 9 
T1 140 61  79 
Table 2: Treatment 1   
Period  # signals # 1  # 0 
1 17  6  11 
2 15  2  13 
3 18  7  11 
4 16  5  11 
5 15  4  11 
6 13 11  2 
7 19 10  9 
8 18  6  12 
9 24 16  8 
10 24  14  10 
T2 179  81  98 
Table 3: Treatment 2   
 
Looking at figure 2 we can conclude that prices converge more often to the true dividend compared 
to Treatment 1. This is due to the larger number of signals purchased and to the better quality of the 
rating agency. In periods 2, 3 , 4 , 5 , and 8 the rating agency leads the market through a fast 
convergence to the correct value of the assets. In periods 1, 6, 7, 9, and 10 the rating agency leads 
the market through a convergence to the wrong value of the assets. It is interesting to note that in 
the last two periods the asset price – even though it remains considerably smaller than the correct 


















Rating Agency Signal Private Signal Dividend Price
 
FIGURE 3: TRADE IN TREATMENT 3 
Treatment 3. This is characterized by a great market activity. In periods 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 there is 
a general tendency for the mean price to move in the correct direction, though this is not always the 
case – in period 1 it moves around the uninformed price; in periods 5, 6 and 9 we can observe a 
general tendency for the mean price to move in the wrong direction, even though at the end of 
periods 6 and 9 it seems that the bubble bursts and the price fall down. 
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FIGURE 4: TRADE IN TREATMENT 4 
Period  # signals  # 1  # 0 
1 9 2  7 
2 8 7  1 
3 10 5  5 
4 7 4  3 
5 9 7  2 
6 11 6  5 
7 13 7  6 
8 8 4  4 
9 10 4  6 
10 17  7  10 
T1 102 53  49 
Table 4: Treatment 3   
Period  # signals # 1  # 0 
1 16  7  9 
2 16  2  14 
3 20 13  7 
4 22  5  17 
5 21 13  8 
6 56 33 23 
7 36 11 25 
8 38  8  30 
9 17 11  6 
10 40  15  25 
T2 282 118 164 
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FIGURE 5: TRADE IN TREATMENT 5 
Treatment 5. This treatment is different from all the other treatments. Looking at figure 5 we cannot 
find a particular structure, we can see a lot of noise coupled with a great subject’s activity. A 
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FIGURE 6: TRADE IN TREATMENT 6 
Period  # signals  # 1  # 0 
1 51  32  19 
2 160  68  92 
3 115  59  56 
4 25  10  15 
5 18 7  11 
6 25  14  11 
7 19 6  13 
8 29  14  15 
9 50  36  14 
10 29 14  15 
T1 521  260  261 
Table 6: Treatment 5   
Period  # signals # 1  # 0 
1 5  1  4 
2 11  5  6 
3 10  6  4 
4 4  0  4 
5 9  4  5 
6 6  1  5 
7 7  3  4 
8 1  0  1 
9 6  4  2 
10 4  1  3 
T2 63  25  38 






































Private Signal Dividend Price  
 F IGURE 7: TRADE IN TREATMENT A    FIGURE 8: TRADE IN TREATMENT B 
 
Consistently with Hey and Morone (2004) and Morone (2008), looking at Figures 1 through Figure 
6 we can state that there were a lot of transactions. In order to verify our hypothesis that the 
presence of the rating agency can improve the efficiency of the market, we tested whether the 
difference between the assets price and its true value is statistically significantly smaller in the 
treatment where there is a rating agency (the groups we have compared are reported in table 8). 
Group 1 Group 2










More precisely, using a two sided U-test we verified that this difference is always statistically (0.01) 
smaller in Group 1. 
 
Further insight into this is given in Figures 9 through Figure 14, which shows the volume of trade 
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FIGURE 1 3 :        F IGURE 14: 
Undoubtedly we can strongly reject the hypothesis of the no-trade equilibrium. Another important 
result is the positive correlation (see figures 15-20) between the number of trades and the volatility 
of price (as measured by the variance). This result is important especially if compared to the very 






































































































































































































FIGURE 1 9       F IGURE 20 
 
Concerning price volatility, looking at figures 21-26 we can observe that volatility decreases 
through treatments 5, 3, 1 and 6, 4, 2 confirming our hypothesis (H4) and (H5). This result goes in 
the same direction of what Hey and Morone (2004) observed concerning the role of the quality of 
information. Indeed, we have a clear negative correlation between quality of information and 
volatility. Additionally, we can observe that the presence of a rating agency is important to reduce the volatility of the price. The more precise is the rating agency the less volatile is the price. 
Apparently, the quality of the private signal plays a marginal role, since we cannot report a 
reduction of the volatility moving from Treatments 1 to Treatment 2, or from Treatments 3 to 
Treatment 4 or from Treatment 5 to Treatment 6 rejecting, hence, our hypotheses (H1), (H2) and 
(H3). 
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We used laboratory experiments to investigate whether the introduction of a rating agency in a set 
up where individuals are otherwise endowed with private information can help the market avoid 
being stuck in a lemming – generated by wrong herding – and/or help the price converge more 
quickly to its fundamental value. The rationale behind this expectation was based on two 
considerations. The first refers to the information structure of the market. Indeed, the rating agency 
can shun herding and help speed up price convergence because it provides the agents with public 
information that is better in quality and is also common knowledge to all the agents. The second 
consideration relates to the massive empirical evidence pinpointing that financial markets show 
significant reactions to (unexpected) rating changes enacted by the agencies. 
We reached two major results showing that, indeed, with the presence of the rating agency the 
probability of herding is reduced and also price convergence is faster. The former result was 
obtained taking Hey and Morone (2004) – who showed that lemmings behaviour can survive in a 
market context where information is private – as the benchmark. Our experiment differed from the one they ran only in terms of the public information made available via the rating agency, which 
may thus be credited as the trigger against herding. 
As to the second result, consistently with the findings of Alfarano et al. (2006) – who showed that 
more information in the market has some effects on trading volume and price volatility – we found 
that the divergence between the market price and the asset’s fundamental value is systematically 
smaller when the rating agency is present. 
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